U.S. cognitive warfare and the politics of perception

Wars are no longer fought only on land or through economic sanctions. The new form of warfare prioritizes ideas, and concepts. The need for control and dominance has shifted from physical battlegrounds to people’s minds. Cognitive warfare blends psychological operations, cultural diplomacy, and information manipulation and seeks to change the perception of individuals and societal levels (Saunders, 1999, p. 15).

This form of influence has been pioneered and perfected by the United States, which instituted it through a blend of statecraft, media, and cultural production for geopolitical gains (Saunders, 1999, pp. 47–49). It is in the power of Washington to alter cultural norms, political allegiances, and even the collective memory of a society. It is possible to shape such fundamentals of society through inculcating narratives into popular culture and elite discourse without physical force (Nye, 2004, p. 11).

Such concepts are rooted in the history of the United States through Hollywood and the CIA’s covert influence on French intellectual life during the Cold War. Before delving into such phenomena, it is essential to learn the theoretical frameworks that explain such influence.

To examine US practices of cognitive warfare, we elaborate on the concepts first. Using Antonio Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony, dominant groups achieve consent through the worldview practices of society’s intellectual and cultural life, alongside some coercion (Gramsci, 1971, p. 57). Building upon this, Joseph Nye defines influence as soft power, which occurs through attraction instead of coercion (Nye, 2004, pp. 5–8). The reality, however, is that US cognitive warfare routinely blends the two. This hybrid approach, which is more akin to a seduction strategy, relies on influence that is invisible, immersive, and self-reinforcing (Nye, 2004, p. 11).

Chomsky and Herman’s propaganda model explains how media outlets filter information to assist the dominant class, thus marginalizing resistance. Within this framework, media neutrality transforms into a strategy to gain influence (Chomsky & Herman, 1988, p. 2). American policy demonstrates that cognitive warfare serves as the foundation for US leadership vis-à-vis the world (Chomsky & Herman, 1988, p. xiv).

Through the CIA’s influence on Cold War French intellectual life and Hollywood’s manipulation of mass narratives, we observe how these ideas and practices materialize at both elite and popular levels (Central Intelligence Agency, 1985, pp. 1–4; Jenkins, 2012, p. 36).

The CIA and the French Intellectual “Defections”

The declassified CIA report “France: Defection of the Leftist Intellectuals” provides a unique, unvarnished look at the mechanisms of US-led cognitive influence. It views renowned French Marxists’ ideological transition towards pro-Western liberalism as a strategically significant transformation in the nation’s cultural command structure, rather than a curious occurrence (Central Intelligence Agency, 1985, p. 1).

The analysis is clinical yet insightful. It does not represent these figures—Lévy, Glucksmann, and Revel—as solitary intellectuals, but rather as gatekeepers of national discourse whose viewpoints may influence the intellectual atmosphere. The descriptive tone conceals a strong practical insight: the most effective approach to change a country’s political trajectory is to reposition the frames of its cultural elite (Central Intelligence Agency, 1985, p. 2).

The study presents this reorientation as a gradual, almost self-propelled process, but the subtext is clear. Exposure, validation, and integration into transatlantic networks served as soft persuasive tools. Those whose critiques of Marxism coincided with American strategic narratives were given public attention, while ideological opponents were permitted to wither in relative obscurity (Central Intelligence Agency, 1985, pp. 2–3).

From an analytical standpoint, the case exemplifies a distinguishing characteristic of state-sponsored cognitive warfare: plausible deniability. There are no overt acts of compulsion here, simply an unseen superstructure of influence that includes filtered access, reframed discussions, and the insidious marginalisation of opposition. The result was not coerced conformity, but rather a reinterpretation of what was intellectually legitimate in French public life, a development that had downstream political ramifications (Central Intelligence Agency, 1985, p. 4).

Hollywood Propaganda

Hollywood has traditionally served as the mass-audience analogue to the elite-level activities detailed in the CIA’s France report. Whereas the CIA attempted to recalibrate cultural gatekeepers’ ideological compass, Hollywood directly incorporated American strategic narratives into the worldwide public imagination (Jenkins, 2012; Robb, 2004).

The mechanics are comparable. In the CIA files, French philosophers who supported anti-Soviet and Atlanticist ideas were rewarded with increased prominence, publication deals, and network integration. In Hollywood, films that affirmed American moral superiority—particularly during the Cold War—were similarly magnified, sponsored, and released around the world. Both were based on the same principle: modify the narrative people hear, and you reshape the framework through which they perceive reality (Robb, 2004, p. 15; Jenkins, 2012, p. 38).

The impact of US intelligence on Hollywood has been demonstrated in declassified documents and investigative reports. The CIA has offered technical guidance, financial, and logistical assistance to film projects that correspond with its favoured storylines, sometimes even moulding screenplays directly. Movies like Argo, Zero Dark Thirty, and The Recruit benefited from direct CIA participation, which provided access to facilities, personnel, and sensitive information in exchange for positive representations of the agency’s role in global events (Jenkins, 2012, pp. 35–36; CIA, 2011).

This friendship goes back decades. During the Cold War, the US government secretly funded films portraying communism as morally corrupt and America as a liberator, either through front organisations or Pentagon cooperation offices (Robb, 2004, pp. 7–9). Even blockbusters like Top Gun were recruiting vehicles, with the Pentagon providing fighter jets and aircraft carriers in exchange for a script that exalted American military prowess (Robb, 2004, p. 15). While not every film was supported by the CIA, there is a clear pattern: when a picture supports a strategic message, the state provides resources, publicity, and international distribution channels (Jenkins, 2012).

I can speak to this personally. As a boy fascinated by the olden days—the 60s to the 90s—Rocky IV was pure magic. The stark Soviet backdrop, Stallone’s raw grit, and the imposing presence of Ivan Drago… it all felt perfect. But what made it electrifying was knowing, even vaguely, that the Cold War was happening. Watching Stallone battle Drago wasn’t just a sport—it was America versus Russia, both on screen and in the world.

Without realizing it, the film seeped into my psyche. I found myself, later as a history student, instinctively leaning toward pro-American interpretations of the Cold War. The influence was subtle, but real—it had shaped my default sympathies before I had the tools to interrogate them. I’m not sharing this to brand America as “the villain,” but to illustrate the mechanism: when entertainment carries embedded geopolitical narratives—whether through covert funding, script shaping, or state-backed distribution—it can mold perspectives without the viewer’s conscious consent (Jenkins, 2012; Robb, 2004).

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References

1. Central Intelligence Agency. (1985). France: Defection of the leftist intellectuals (CIA-RDP86S00588R000300380001-5). Central Intelligence Agency. Retrieved October 7, 2025, fromhttps://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp86s00588r000300380001-5
2. Chomsky, N., & Herman, E. S. (1988). Manufacturing consent: The political economy of the mass media. Pantheon Books.
3. CIA. (2011). The CIA and pop culture. CIA Stories. Retrieved October 8, 2025, fromhttps://www.cia.gov/stories/story/the-cia-and-pop-culture/
4. Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the prison notebooks (Q. Hoare & G. N. Smith, Eds.). International Publishers.
5. Jenkins, T. (2012). The CIA in Hollywood: How the agency shapes film and television. University of Texas Press.
6. Nye, J. S. (2004). Soft power: The means to success in world politics. Public Affairs.
7. Robb, D. L. (2004). Operation Hollywood: How the Pentagon shapes and censors the movies. Prometheus Books.
8. Saunders, F. S. (1999). Who paid the piper? The CIA and the cultural Cold War. Granta Books.